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Abstract 
Ernst Mach and the Vienna Circle are linked historically, but conceptually the 
views of Mach do not fit well with logical positivism. My purpose in the present pa-
per is to reconsider 1) Mach’s positive natural philosophy 2) what Mach meant by 
“anti-metaphysics”, 3) whether Mach really was “anti-metaphysical” in the sense of 
demanding verification in principle for every term or statement in science, and 4) 
how Mach’s views on metaphysics differed from those of many Vienna Circle phi-
losophers. I believe a strong case can be made for separating Mach’s realistic version 
of empiricism from that of the Vienna Circle, but perhaps the “received view” of 
the Vienna Circle philosophers does not describe their views very well either. 
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1. Introduction 
The Viennese physicist Ernst Mach (1838-1916) was a major influence 
on the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, such as Philipp Frank, Otto 
Neurath, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap. It is commonly believed that 
the Vienna Circle wanted metaphysics to be eliminated from science, where 
“metaphysics” meant any term or proposition unverifiable in principle by 
experience, a program they supposedly inherited from Mach himself. So, 
when this verificationist “received view” of scientific theories (Suppe 1977) 
came under attack in the 1960s and 70s, in favor of realist and historicist 
philosophy of science, Mach was often lumped in with the Vienna Circle as 
a naïve positivist whose views could be considered refuted along with 
theirs. This has been a commonly held view ever since, but the story does 
little justice to Mach’s actual views on metaphysics, or even those of the Vi-
enna Circle philosophers. My purpose in the present paper is to reconsider 
1) Mach’s natural philosophy, 2) what Mach actually meant by “anti-
metaphysics”, 3) whether Mach really was “anti-metaphysical” in the sense 
of demanding verification in principle for every term or statement in sci-
ence, and 4) how Mach’s views on metaphysics differed from those of many 
Vienna Circle philosophers. I believe a strong case can be made for separat-
ing Mach’s realistic brand of empiricism from that of the Vienna Circle, but 
perhaps “the received view” of the Vienna Circle philosophers does not de-
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scribe their views very well either (as has come to light in work by Uebel 
2007, Richardson 2008, Friedman 1999 and Stadtler 1997 among others). 
2. Good Metaphysics: Mach’s Theory of Elements 
Mach’s overall view of science was really a kind of naturalistic monism 
of what he called the “elements” (Mach 1872/1910, 1883/1960, 1886/1959, 
1905/1976, Banks 2003). According to Mach, the world is composed of 
these elements, which are events in causal-functional relations to each 
other, not of spatio-temporal objects (as in materialism) or minds (as in ide-
alism). In fact, elements are what is left when we deconstruct physical ob-
jects into complexes of physical events causally linked together by their ef-
fects, and when we deconstruct the permanent ego into events such as sen-
sations, images, thoughts linked together by functional connections such as 
memory, reasoning or association ultimately realized in the brain. For 
Mach, sensations of color or sound are only “mental” if we choose to con-
centrate on their psychological relations with memory images and other as-
sociations, otherwise they are also “physical” elements in their relation to 
the brain and to other physical events in the environment: 
A color is a physical object as soon as we consider its dependence for instance 
upon its luminous source, upon other colors, upon temperature, upon spaces and so 
forth. When we consider, however, its dependence upon the retina [...] it is a psy-
chological object, a sensation. Not the subject matter but the direction of our inves-
tigation is different in the two domains. 
[...] it is only in their functional dependence that the elements are sensations. In 
another functional relation they are at the same time physical objects. We only use 
the additional term “sensations” to describe the elements because most people are 
more familiar with the elements in question as sensations (colors, sounds, pressures, 
spaces, times) (1886/1959, p. 16). 
In themselves, elements are simply concrete natural events, whether 
these events occur in minds or in the physical universe. Even a vivid sensa-
tion of red need not be considered mental or a “secondary quality”, since it 
is also a physical happening linked to other physical happenings. Bertrand 
Russell especially appreciated Mach’s discovery as a breakthrough in the 
mind-body problem, calling it a “service to philosophy”, “that what is ex-
perienced may be a part of the physical world and often is so” (Russell 
1914/1984, p. 31), and that “constituents of the physical world can be im-
mediately present to me” (p. 22). Russell called Mach’s view “neutral mo-
nism” and began as a skeptic of the view until he converted in 1919 and 
expanded the view in books like the Analysis of Mind (1921) and The 
Analysis of Matter (1927). 
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While sensations always have a physical interpretation as elements, 
clearly not all elements are sensations. Nor can we avoid assuming unob-
served events in nature, especially not in physics. Mach always emphasized 
that we “complete partially observed facts in thought” by filling in unob-
served elements making up the rest of an object. For example we attribute 
backs and sides to chairs we don’t see, and we adjoin past and future states 
to presently observed phenomena such as the path of a body in a parabola, 
when we only actually see its present position and velocity at any one time. 
In his Mechanics, Mach gave the example of a vibrating rod in a vice 
(1883/1960, p. 587), to show that continuity with experience is all he de-
manded: 
If a long elastic rod be fastened in a vice, the rod may be made to execute slow 
vibrations. These are directly observable, can be seen, touched and graphically re-
corded. If the rod be shortened, the vibrations will increase in rapidity and cannot 
be directly seen; the rod will present a blurred image. This is a new phenomenon. 
But the sensation of touch is still like that of the previous case; we can still make the 
rod record its movements; and if we mentally retain the conception of vibrations, we 
can still anticipate the results of experiments. On further shortening the rod the sen-
sation of touch is altered; the rod begins to sound; again a new phenomenon is pre-
sented. But the phenomena do not all change at once; only this or that phenomenon 
changes; consequently the accompanying notion of vibration, which is not confined 
to any single one, is still serviceable, still economical. Even when the sound has 
reached so high a pitch and the vibrations have become so small that the previous 
means of observation are not of avail, we still advantageously imagine the sounding 
rod to perform vibrations, and can predict the vibrations of the dark lines in the 
spectrum of the polarized light of a rod of glass. If on the rod being further short-
ened all of the phenomena suddenly passed into new phenomena, the conception of 
vibration would no longer afford us a means of supplementing the new experiences 
by the previous ones. When we mentally add to those actions of a human being 
which we can perceive, sensations and ideas like our own which we cannot perceive, 
the idea of the object that we form is economical. The idea makes experience intel-
ligible to us; it supplements and supplants experience. Now, this is exactly what we 
do when we imagine a moving body which has just disappeared behind a pillar, or a 
comet at the moment invisible, as continuing its motion and retaining its previously 
observed properties. We do this so that we may not be surprised by its reappear-
ance. We fill out the gaps in experience by the ideas which experience suggests 
(1883/1960, pp. 587-588). 
Mach’s view was not that science was permanently restricted to what is 
directly observable, but rather was limited to phenomena causally continu-
ous with observation, that is open to causal interaction with the world of 
experienced events, experience being one kind of causal interaction but not 
the only one by any means. I believe that when Mach used the subjective 
sounding word “sensation” he implicitly meant to include the idea that the 
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sensation was also a physical element and when he used the words “experi-
ence” (Erfahrung) and “verification” (kontrollieren) he probably had in 
mind this broader idea of phenomena somehow continuous with experience 
in one fabric and certainly not merely what is experienced directly, which is 
too naïve for any practical physicist like Mach to seriously believe. 
Certainly Mach was no foundationalist about his elementary events ei-
ther. Mach himself often emphasized that the elements were “only provi-
sional in nature like the elements of alchemy” which we “cannot presently 
divide further” (1905/1976, p. 12n). Elements are not epistemological “giv-
ens” or indivisible “sense data” upon which to base the rest of knowledge 
as a foundation, a complete misunderstanding of Mach’s naturalistic and 
evolutionary theory of knowledge (as Feyerabend 1984 correctly points 
out). We don’t begin with elements, we are supposed to keep analyzing 
them further as science progresses; the title of Mach’s famous book is the 
Analysis of Sensations. Moreover, there are no isolated elements to begin 
with: we are always surrounded by elements-in-complexes in one causally 
connected whole of material nature, and only with difficulty can we succeed 
in isolating elements from the rest of nature. What is “given” is the whole, if 
anything, not the pieces. Otto Neurath, who later emphasized holism in his 
discussions in the Vienna Circle, and who used the famous metaphor of 
“repairing the ship while at sea” to deny epistemic foundationalism, 
claimed in a letter to have been influenced by Mach in this view (Neurath 
to Mach c. 1914 in Thiele 1978, p. 100): 
It was this thought in your Mechanics which never let loose of me from the first 
reading and which influenced the development of my ideas in strange ways even in 
the area of political economy (Volkswirtschaft). It is the inclination to derive the 
sense of the individual from the whole, not the whole from a sum of individuals. 
Likewise in psychology, Mach also called attention to “holistic” overall 
sensations of form or symmetry, (see Mach 1871 and 1886/1959) later cited 
by Christian von Ehrenfels (1890) one of the founders of Gestalt psychology. 
Finally, Mach’s elements were nothing like passive empiricist “sense 
data” or atomistic Humean “impressions”. Mach often spoke of the ele-
ments as being like forces or pressures, related to each other by real “varia-
tion and counter-variation” (Mach 1883/1960, pp. 604-605) in their real in-
tensities, not mere mathematical relationships. Mach held to the view that 
particular element-to-element relations were as real as elements themselves 
and coined a principle of the functional interdependence of phenomena. 
He avoided mechanistic views of causation and denied that we can read off 
variations of elements a priori, but he should not be considered a Humean 
about causation. The elements, including the sensations under their physi-
cal description, are events which seem to directly manifest forces or physi-
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cal “potential changes”, (Mach 1883/1960, p. 606; 1976/1905, p. 357) re-
lated by natural laws. The job of science is to bring these empirically real 
and objective functional relations among particulars at level one into some 
kind of economical order under theoretical laws and postulates at a higher 
order of abstraction at level two (for this idea of “two level” Machian econ-
omy see Banks 2004). I have shown at length that Mach borrowed this idea 
that elementary events, and even sensation qualities like red or blue, ex-
press real forces, from the psychology of German philosopher J.F. Herbart 
(Herbart 1964; Banks 2003, Chapter 3). 
As I hope is clear by now, Mach’s view is very far from a standard em-
piricist or positivist philosophy a la Hume or Suppe’s “received view” of 
logical positivism. His view is far more robust and realistic about its ele-
ments and causal-functional relations than empiricists are wont to be, and 
much more realistic about unobserved elements than any card-carrying 
positivist would readily admit. I have taken to calling Mach a “realistic em-
piricist”, like Russell and James, to separate him from phenomenalist phi-
losophers and positivistic scientists (see Banks forthcoming). I am really not 
sure how Mach came to be known as an extreme positivist or “phenomenal-
ist” who believed only in sensations, a misreading against which he pro-
tested vigorously in his lifetime, but which seems to stick to his writings in 
popular thought. Certainly Lenin, in Empiricism and Empirio-Criticism 
(1909) sought to declassify Mach and his colleague Richard Avenarius, and 
others, as reactionary idealists, and Lenin himself was totally baffled by the 
new term “element”, ultimately concluding that it simply meant “sensation” 
as in the philosophy of Berkeley or Hume. 
Mach and Avenarius secretly smuggle in materialism by means of the word 
“element”, which supposedly frees their theory of the one-sidedness of subjective 
idealism, supposedly permits the assumption that the mental is dependent on the ret-
ina, nerves and so forth and the assumption that the physical is independent of the 
human organism. In fact, of course, the trick with the word “element” is a wretched 
sophistry, for a materialist who reads Mach and Avenarius will immediately ask: 
what are the “elements”? Either the “element” is a sensation, as all empirio-
criticists, Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt, etc. maintain – in which case your philosophy, 
gentlemen, is idealism, vainly seeking to hide the nakedness of its solipsism under 
the cloak of a more “objective” terminology; or the element is not a sensation – in 
which case absolutely no thought whatever is attached to the “new” term; it is merely 
an empty bauble (Lenin 1908/1952, pp. 48, 49). 
But Lenin’s book was a brutal Streitschrift against the Russian neo-
Machists, which did not even try to do justice to opposing views. It is thus 
remarkable how many trained philosophers who should have known better 
(like Popper and Schlick) simply fell in line behind Lenin’s reading, and not 
for example Russell’s superior “neutral monist” reading, and this has re-
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mained the case all the way up to fairly recent times (Blackmore 1973, 1992, 
but see Stubenberg 2010).  
Much of the blame for the “phenomenalist” reading must certainly be 
placed at the door of Mach himself. No doubt it was easier for many au-
thors to cite secondary works than to deal with the rigors of Mach’s own 
demanding works. He also had the misfortune to frame a view that is super-
ficially similar in style to Hume, or the later Vienna Circle philosophers, 
and could be glossed over as such, while being completely different under-
neath on a closer reading. And of course Mach did sometimes write care-
lessly as if to suggest that the world “consisted of sensations” when he 
clearly meant elements, or to suggest that things that “could not enter con-
sciousness” simply did not exist, where (presumably) he meant to say things 
not continuously connected or connectible with experience or the whole of 
natural phenomena do not exist, a far more plausible claim. 
Mach was, of course, famously skepticism of atoms and the kinetic in-
terpretation of the second law of thermodynamics, and the debates with 
Boltzmann and Planck around the turn of the century seemed to confirm 
Mach as the defender of unrealistic positivism against their more sensible 
belief in atoms and the idea that heat is the kinetic energy of molecules, al-
though Mach’s replies would not confirm this reading. The actual story is 
much more complicated, and it is by no means clear there was a “winner” 
since realism also came to grief in the rise of the quantum theory; more 
likely both sides simply misunderstood each other. Mach himself thought 
the increasingly unpleasant debate with Planck was “silly” and Einstein 
wrote Mach that he thought Planck’s attacks on him were “unjust”. 
Mach apparently thought atoms were metaphysical Kantian “things in 
themselves” permanently shut out from the world of observation, and even 
outside of space and time, imaginary objects which he says “can never be 
the object of sensory observation” whereas atoms for Planck, Boltzmann, 
and Einstein were very small objects but otherwise their properties were 
completely continuous with those of visible objects like space and time ex-
tension, mass, momentum and so forth (a view that also cannot be consid-
ered correct after the rise of quantum theory). Mach provisionally believed 
in atoms earlier in his career and he even used the atomic theory in his deri-
vation of shock waves behind supersonic bullets. There are surprising re-
marks in his notebooks stored at the Deutsches Museum which describe 
one atom pushing on the next in the shock wave, so he was perfectly capa-
ble of using the theory when it suited him. Mach also briefly converted to 
atomism in 1903 when Stefan Meyer convinced him with an experiment 
(Blackmore 1992, Banks 2003), perhaps provoking a later remark in Mach’s 
notebook “atoms not occult?” But since he still published anti-atomistic 
statements after the so-called conversion, it seems likely that Mach still held 
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out for a deeper understanding of atoms through his theory of elements and 
deeper dynamical laws of energy transformation, believing that ultimately 
elements would prove more fundamental than atoms even if they did exist 
(see Feyerabend 1984 for that view which seems right to me). 
As I hope is also clear by now, the Elementenlehre was indeed a genuine 
scientific metaphysics, or natural philosophy, although Mach would have 
claimed he was only doing unified science or metascience. Not being a 
trained philosopher, he failed to see that this is literally what “metaphysics” 
means in its traditional Aristotelian sense, and in fact he criticized other au-
thors such as Gerardus Heymans for calling unified science metaphysics: 
One is curious why, if on Heymans’ view the method of metaphysics is exactly 
the same as that  of natural science, though extended to a wider field, he insists on 
calling it metaphysics, a term with so distasteful a flavor since Kant, and one that 
seems contradicted by the addition “on the basis of experience” (Mach 1905/1976, 
pp. 13-14n). 
Mach believed that his elements already exhausted our knowledge of 
the material universe, in the sense that behind experience, figuratively 
speaking, we would simply find more experience, more of the same elements 
and functions continuous with those we observe within experience, al-
though the process of discovery never ends and results are never set in 
stone. This is the real reason, I think, why Mach was dismissive of the 
search for unobserved entities and mechanisms in nature since, for him, the 
discovery would simply push the search for elements and functions another 
step back. 
The theory of elements and functions served Mach as a kind of over-
arching “umbrella theory” for unifying the sciences, physics and psychology 
among others. It also served Mach as an engine of analysis for criticizing 
and streamlining science by “eliminating metaphysics”, leaving the bare 
elements and functions without any added residue of mechanisms or visual 
models. Clearly “good” metaphysics, for Mach involved the philosophical 
attempt to unify the sciences under one roof, metaphysics as metascience, 
but he refused to call this metaphysics. He was actively engaged in this pro-
ject in his own work and wrote with great sensitivity about the relation be-
tween science and philosophy in his Knowledge and Error: 
Through its many attempts to summarize the most general features of large ar-
eas, philosophy has gained ample experience in this line, even learning gradually to 
recognize and avoid some of its own mistakes that the philosophically untrained sci-
entist is almost bound to commit even today. However philosophy has furnished 
science with some positive notions too, for example ideas of conservation (Mach 
1905/1976, p. 3).  
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He was also aware that science often borrows “covertly” from philoso-
phical thought, as he himself had borrowed ideas from Leibniz, Kant, Her-
bart, Fechner, Mayer and other philosopher-scientists. Sadly, Mach added 
that “few philosophers today take part in the work of science and only ex-
ceptionally do scientists address their intellectual attention to philosophical 
questions”. This is only more true today. 
Generally, Mach favored monism over dualism, especially mind-matter 
monism. He emphasized the reality of immediate experience and rejected 
the idea that sensations are purely mental. He was nominalistic in the sense 
that he believed in particular matters of fact, individual, unique and non-
repeating events, not abstractions or generalities, saying that “nature has 
but an individual existence”. And yet he emphasized the view of a continu-
ously connected whole of particulars in causal-functional relationships, as 
Neurath correctly perceived. And, unlike Hume, he did believe in the real-
ity of general laws of nature and relations between particulars. Finally, 
Mach thought of his general theory of elements and functions as an “um-
brella theory” for the design of particular empirical theories in physics and 
perceptual psychology, science at a higher level of generality, which is what 
many would consider metaphysics by the purest Aristotelian definition. So 
clearly these features outline “good” metaphysics, even if Mach would have 
rejected the term. We now turn to what Mach considered “bad” metaphys-
ics, and then examine his differences with the Vienna Circle on this issue.  
3. Bad Metaphysics I: Kant 
There is no doubt that Mach considered Kant to be the source of many 
metaphysical errors, of which the most serious were 1) the thing in itself 2) 
the unchanging ego or substance 3) synthetic a priori principles of natural 
science. Mach believed the thing in itself arose from the following faulty in-
ference: 
The vague image which we have of a given permanent complex, being an image 
which does not perceptibly change when one or another of the component parts is 
taken away, seems to be something which exists in itself. Inasmuch as it is possible 
to take away singly every constituent part without destroying the capacity of the im-
age to stand for the totality and be recognized again, it is imagined that it is possible 
to subtract all the parts and to have something still remaining. Thus naturally arises 
the philosophical notion, at first impressive, but subsequently recognized as mon-
strous, of a “thing in itself”, different from is “appearance” and unknowable (Mach 
1886/1959, p. 6). 
Mach goes on to point out that there is no unseen substance or anchor 
for the elements making up a body. Remove all of the effects of the body 
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and nothing whatever remains. The thing in itself, or the substance, as well 
as any intrinsic properties it might have, would be something which exists 
in permanent isolation from its exercised effects and this is impossible, an 
Unding. Even if a thing exercised the same uniform effects or qualities 
across a variety of circumstances, this would still not prove that it would 
possess them alone and isolated. For example inertial mass, which is often 
taken to be an intrinsic property of bodies by philosophers was for Mach 
due to the interaction of a body with its environment, either of other gravi-
tating bodies or of an ambient “inertial field” (Mach 1883/1960, pp. 282-
283). 
The unchanging (absolute) ego and unchanging substance, two pillars of 
Kant’s view of conservation and permanence in the Critique of Pure Reason 
are likewise seen by Mach as dangerous abstractions from experience lead-
ing to metaphysics in the bad sense. Experience presents only changing 
events and complexes both in the ego and in states of external objects. The 
idea of an absolute permanence either of substance or ego behind these 
events was to Mach an unjustified inference. We could account for our 
ideas of permanence by considering present memory traces or records, 
which stand for previous states no longer present. It is not necessary for 
anything actually to survive absolutely complete and intact from one tem-
poral moment to the next. The idea of an “absolute time” or a fixed back-
ground or substance in which to embed these states and records was seen 
by Mach as metaphysical and unwarranted in the worst sense, and useless 
for science. 
Finally of course Kant had thought that some principles of natural sci-
ence itself, ideas of conservation of mass or momentum and some other 
principles like the principle of inertia and the Galilean relativity of uniform 
motion, were synthetic a priori, or based upon deeper synthetic a priori 
principles in the understanding and not empirical fact. In his Conservation 
of Energy and his Mechanics, I think it is fair to say that Mach destroyed ut-
terly Kant’s argument for synthetic a priori principles in natural science 
with a withering series of attacks. Instead of an a priori truth, Mach shows 
that the conservation of energy is in fact an empirical assumption which 
cannot be proved from the understanding without making the assumption 
itself somewhere else. A similar criticism is applied to symmetry arguments 
like the one Archimedes used to prove the law of the lever. To call two 
cases symmetrical, like equal weights on lever arms of equal length from the 
fulcrum, invites the reply: symmetrical for what property? Reason or the 
understanding cannot simply dictate that two cases are symmetrical unless 
this case of symmetry can be established empirically for some property. 
And, as Mach showed, once the symmetry is assumed it is no great matter 
to “prove” it again from that assumption. The asymmetrical case of unequal 
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weights m1 m2 equilibrating each other along unequal lever arms m1.l2= m2.l1 
actually lies at the foundation of the case of symmetry of equal weights at 
equal distances, not vice versa  (Mach 1883/1960, p. 24). The superficially 
dazzling and seeming a priori cast of these arguments in physics is ex-
plained by the making of an empirical assumption among the premises 
which renders the whole deduction circular. It is not due to the magical 
construction of physical laws a priori by the understanding. As Stevinus 
(Mach 1883/1960 p. 41) remarked in proving the law of the inclined plane 
from his thought experiment of the endless chain: Wonder en ist geen won-
der: “The wonderful thing about it is that it is no wonder at all”. 
The parallelogram of forces, which is cited by Kant as another a priori 
principle is subject to the same objection as the law of the lever, once it is 
assumed that forces are subject to the principle of superposition, an empiri-
cal fact. In the case of the law of inertia and Galilean relativity, in which 
Kant saw the a priori structure of space and motion constructed by the un-
derstanding reflected in the actual motions of bodies, Mach had an equally 
simple (and disillusioning) answer. These cases of statics and uniform mo-
tions are only special cases of dynamical principles such as D’Alembert’s 
Principle. In reality, bodies are never in force free situations, they are al-
ways accelerating each other, nor do we have access to a universe free of 
other bodies or surrounding fields to tell us how a body would move natu-
rally and inertially. We do know however that when all forces on a body can-
cel, then it behaves in accord with Galilean relativity and the law of inertia. 
These inertial motions are then interpreted by Mach as natural cases of dy-
namic equilibrium, not a priori truths about “natural” motion in space and 
time. Mach keeps Newton’s second law and derives the first law and also 
the fifth corollary from it. Where all of the accelerating forces on a body 
cancel, the body is either at rest or moves at a constant velocity (Mach 
1883/1960, pp. 285-289). Mach also suggested that the law of inertia could 
even fail in a situation where the dynamical equilibrium was suddenly dis-
turbed. These considerations would of course have to be modified today to 
recognize that Newtonian mechanics was supplanted by relativity and 
quantum theory, but Kant’s synthetic a priori would not gain any traction 
thereby. 
Mach comments that much a priori knowledge is merely empirically and 
historically well- founded but not “apodictically” certain. Some principles 
come to seem inevitable and demanded by reason or the understanding 
which really are not so because we have forgotten their foundation in ex-
perience. According to Mach, historical studies are the only way to break 
the hold of these ideas on our minds, not studies of physics alone, where 
the historical prejudices are, if anything, reinforced by repetition. Mach 
said this a century before Thomas Kuhn and other critical historians of sci-
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ence. He observed that principles and concepts that originally required the 
highest and most strenuous philosophical effort for the best minds to estab-
lish are taught to the physicist as obvious and trivial and not worth the 
trouble of investigating. But this also means that they do not see how to 
analyze and question these concepts and principles should it ever again be-
come necessary to do so. Concepts like space, time, motion, mass, force, 
and energy can thus seem to be part of the a priori structure of the world 
established by the understanding if they are not strenuously criticized and 
re-examined. Of course most of Mach’s best work in physics was devoted 
to uncovering the historical roots of these concepts (they are what all of his 
books on physics are about) and then subjecting them to a conceptual cri-
tique that exposed their foundation in experience. This made it easier for 
scientists like Einstein who were inspired by Mach to press on and take the 
questioning still further. 
4. Bad Metaphysics II: Metaphysical Errors of Psychology 
Psychology was the source of many metaphysical errors according to 
Mach. Chief among them was of course the mind-matter dualism he 
claimed to have overcome in his theory of neutral elements. Sensory quali-
ties like red or blue are not secondary qualities; they are physical events and 
part of the physical world, as much as any natural events. That these events 
occur in the brain is no objection to their reality. The error was in assuming 
that the sensations exist in some special mental realm of the ego different 
and separate from the world of physics, but this is only because our view of 
physics is too limited and abstract and must be broadened to include sense 
experience (see Banks 2010, and forthcoming).  
Other problems emerge from a confusion between physical and psycho-
logical spaces and events. For example, Mach’s colleague Richard Ave-
narius referred to an “error of introjection” in which we observe a friend’s 
brain while he is experiencing some color like the green of a leaf (or our 
own brains in a mirror). We then ask ourselves where in the friend’s brain 
tissue we are supposed to look for his sensation of green, we introject it spa-
tially into his brain somewhere. But nothing in the friend’s brain actually 
looks green, not the electrochemical connections between neurons, nor 
events within the neurons or anything else. All we see are cells connected 
up in various configurations. The faulty conclusion is that colors and brain 
processes therefore cannot be identical. 
A second, related problem is called the “error of bilocation” where we 
ask how it is that a sensation, say of a cup can be five feet in front of me on 
the table and, at the same time, be a brain process in the back of my skull, 
since those two events are not located in the same place. The false conclu-
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sion is, once again, that sensations and brain processes cannot be identical 
and in fact be in the same place. 
According to Mach the resolution is simpler than it seems and involves 
what he calls a “functional” presentation of the various elements involved 
(Mach 1886/1959, p. 27). In the first class are the physical-psychical sensa-
tions. They are qualities like red or blue, which are also, and at the same 
time, physical brain events causally connected to other physical events. In 
the second class are observations of brain tissue made by external observers 
or measuring devices. These scans or observations do not represent actual 
events in the brain; they are rather external events annexed to these brain 
events by causal chains. The scan shows where in the brain the sensation 
events occur and generally do show what sort of physical events and struc-
tures surround them, but they are not the actual blue or red experienced in 
the individual event itself, to the possessor of the brain. Proof: if we si-
phoned off the neural energy of the cells, the sensation would disappear. 
Those interior events are not present in the scan, but rather occur in the 
“mind” of the observer. But imagine a kind of super-graph or functional 
presentation, in which there is no problem keeping the events distinct in the 
two subspaces, while acknowledging the fact that they are causally related 
and participate in the same causal functional space of events. This is how 
the “problem of introjection” is resolved. To combat the error of biloca-
tion, Mach offers his famous “headless body” picture (Mach 1886/1959, p. 
19): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mach’s “headless body” figure (public domain) 
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He uses this figure to prove that in fact the sensation and the brain 
process do not actually exist in two different places. As the headless body 
picture shows, the sensation and the brain process never occupy the self-
same psychological space. Rather the space of sensation loops around the 
brain and leaves a blank where the objector seeks to point to his sensation 
at the back of his skull, which he cannot do, not even with a mirror in 
which he observes his own brain tissue. If he does insert an electrode in the 
brain right at the “x” where the sensation should occur, it promptly disap-
pears, proving they cannot share the same space and that they are identical, 
and not bilocated. Nor do the externally observed elements of the brain tis-
sue in the mirror and the actual elements in the brain share the same space, 
as in bilocation, since they are different elements and simply exist side by 
side. These metaphysical problems can thus be resolved by expanding our 
view to elements and the “functional presentation” of the elements which 
includes both the space of psychology and the physical space where others 
observe and interact with the brain. (For more see Banks 2003, and forth-
coming).  
5. Bad Metaphysics III: Mechanical Physics 
Finally physics was a major source of metaphysical errors for Mach. Ac-
cording to Mach, the role of the critical investigator was to separate the 
principles and empirically valid results of physics from the “mechanical phi-
losophy” in which they were often embedded. The mechanical philosophy 
was the idea that physics necessarily represents to us a world of particulate 
matter and motion in space and time operating according to causal mecha-
nisms which we can readily visualize in our spatial imaginations. It is the 
idea that every natural principle or postulate of experience, such as the laws 
of thermodynamics or the law of least action, are ultimately to be realized in 
a deeper mechanical explanation which makes them true. This view began 
in the seventeenth century with Galileo, Locke, Descartes and Newton and 
extended all the way through to Mach’s century, where it was represented 
by the acknowledged masters of classical physics: Thomson, Maxwell, 
Boltzmann, Helmholtz, Hertz and Planck among others. 
Mach pointed out however in his Conservation of Energy, Mechanics and 
Principles of the Theory of Heat that most, if not all, of the fundamental 
principles of mechanics, like the conservation of energy, or the law of least 
action, or the second law of thermodynamics were mechanism-independent 
and certainly did not depend on being realized in some mechanical model 
of nature convenient for human visualization. Mach called these mechanism 
independent principles “phenomenological physics” and he called for the 
elimination of superfluous models, whether of hidden pulleys and wheels, 
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atoms, elastic bands, fluid and elastic media, absolute space and time, or 
what have you. Mach thought we should be satisfied to accept physical 
principles as postulates of experience which are not contradicted by any 
natural events and accept them in that stark postulate form without seeking 
realizing mechanisms behind them. Ultimately of course they are built into 
Mach’s view as abstract causal-functional relations between elementary 
events. 
Physical processes present numerous analogies with purely mechanical ones. 
Differences of temperature and electric differences equilibrate themselves in a simi-
lar way to the differences of the position of masses. Laws which correspond to the 
Newtonian principle of reaction, to the law of conservation of the center of gravity, 
to the conservation of the quantity of motion, the principle of least action, and so 
on, may be set up in all physical domains. These analogies may be made to rest upon 
the assumption which the physicist is fond of making, namely, that all physical 
processes are in reality mechanical. But I have long been of the opinion that we can 
discover general phenomenological laws under which the mechanical ones are to be 
classed as special cases. Mechanics is not to serve for the explanation of these phe-
nomenological laws but as a model in form and as an indicator in searching for 
them. The chief value of mechanics seems to me to lie in this (Mach 1896/1986, pp. 
328-329, Cf. Mach 1883/1960, p. 599). 
According to Mach, Newton had made a great error in accepting an ab-
solute frame of reference, or absolute space, for the accelerations and iner-
tial motions mentioned in his second and first laws. As Mach was aware, all 
the second law really demanded was an equivalence class of inertial refer-
ence frames in which the accelerations remain the same, not an absolute 
space with unobserved (and in principle unobservable) position, direction 
and velocity as Newton had insisted. Proof: transform x to x* by x*= x + x0 
+ ct and differentiate twice with respect to time. First x0 vanishes and then 
the c, leaving the accelerations equal, x’’=x*``. And of course Mach eventu-
ally came to think that even accelerated motions could be relativized in a 
similar manner, leaving invariant a kind of combined inertio-gravitational 
field, which he suggests as one possibility (Mach 1883/1960, pp. 282-283 
and as I have recently suggested as my preferred reading of Mach’s Princi-
ple see Banks 2012 and forthcoming) not an unobservable absolute space 
prior to this field, which he continued to see as a metaphysical “monstros-
ity”. Unfortunately the history of Mach’s Principle is very complicated, 
since Einstein formulated his own “Mach’s Principle”, and this is the one 
known to physicists, as well as further interpretations, which have little to 
do with Mach. I myself think Mach is closer to Leibniz in his views on rela-
tive motion (see Banks forthcoming). 
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In any case, Mach’s attack on mechanical visualizations and models was 
as influential as his other reforms of physics. Einstein spoke movingly of 
this influence on his thought: 
It was Ernst Mach, in his history of mechanics, who shook this dogmatic faith 
(i.e., in mechanics as the secure basis of physics); this book, in this relation, exer-
cised a deep influence on me as a student. (Einstein 1949, p. 7, and for the possible 
influence of Mach’s non-mechanical principle-driven “phenomenological physics” 
on Einstein, see pp. 53, 57, also Feyerabend 1984, Banks 2003, p. 188). 
Unfortunately, Mach’s avowed “anti-mechanism”, as much as it blazed 
the trail for those who followed, like Einstein and Heisenberg, was also the 
reason why he felt he had to attack atoms so vehemently (in addition to the 
anti-Kantian reasons given above). As I have shown elsewhere, this was part 
of a much more general attack on the spatio-temporal form of mechanical 
physics. Mach was skeptical of the concepts of space, time, and motion in 
any fundamental sense because he believed these concepts ultimately de-
rived from human psychology and visualization and proved convenient as a 
format for interpreting abstract functional laws and equations of physics 
without being their true natural foundation which was independent of hu-
man sensibility. A future physics could keep the abstract equations between 
events and dispense with the spatio-temporal format for a truly universal 
physics of elements and functions. As far as I know, Mach first spoke of this 
aim openly in an 1871 paper “Über die physikalische Bedeutung der Ge-
setze der Symmetrie”, remarking: 
If someone who could only hear wanted to try and develop a world-view in his 
linear space, he would come up considerably short, in that his space is not equal to 
the many-sidedness of the real relationships. It is no more justified when we think 
we can press the entire world, even the unseen parts, into the space of the eye. But 
all molecular theories fall under this heading. Yet we possess a sense which, in re-
spect to the many-sidedness of the relations it is capable of contemplating, is richer 
than any other. It is our reason. It stands above our senses. It alone is in the position 
to establish a lasting and complete worldview. The mechanical worldview has 
achieved enormously much since Galilei. But it must make way for a freer perspec-
tive (Mach 1871, p. 147). 
He then adds in a footnote: 
It follows from this that the dependence of natural phenomena be expressed 
through relations of number, not spatially or temporally (Ibid.). 
It had already occurred to him in 1863 that the spectral lines of chemi-
cal elements were too numerous, he claimed, to be represented as vibra-
tions between little spatio-temporal objects like balls on springs, an argu-
ment he repeated and embellished in his Conservation of Energy of 1872. 
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Of course Mach did not try very hard to think of other spatio-temporal ar-
rangements like atoms with internal structure, but went straight to the con-
clusion that atomic processes were not in space and time at all. I think this 
is because Mach was already convinced on philosophical grounds that the 
source of the spectral lines was not mechanical processes in space and time 
but a level beneath which only abstract functions and elements could de-
scribe. Mach was still arguing this way in 1905: 
The moment we begin to operate with mere things of thought like atoms and 
molecules, which from their very nature can never be made the objects of sensory 
contemplation, we are under no obligation to think of them as standing in spatial re-
lationships which are peculiar to the Euclidean three-dimensional space of our sen-
suous experience (Mach 1905/1976, pp. 324-325). 
The temptation is to say that Mach was simply too early for the quan-
tum theory, aspects of which do indeed forbid a naïve space time interpre-
tation of events, or processes behind events, but I will resist this and say 
that Mach simply wanted to eliminate “psychological” space and time from 
physics completely for some new abstract theory that dispensed with hu-
man sensibility and appealed only to our reason. 
To sum up, the “received view” that metaphysics involves entities un-
verifiable in principle plays a relatively small part in Mach’s thinking. He 
does oppose entities completely unconnected in any way with natural phe-
nomena, like the permanently isolated thing in itself, but natural phenom-
ena are much broader than immediate experience for Mach and really in-
volve a continuously connected whole of nature and experience in one mo-
nistic fabric, of experience-reality, with parts that are observed and unob-
served but filled in nevertheless. Of the critiques of metaphysics mentioned 
above, most are entirely idiosyncratic to Mach and have nothing to do with 
the received view or the Vienna Circle. 
6. Differences between Mach and the Vienna Circle 
Friedrich Stadler’s Studien zum Wiener Kreis (Stadler 1997) is still the 
most comprehensive attempt so far to define the influence of Ernst Mach 
on the philosophers of the Vienna Circle. Although the Vienna Circle has 
been studied intensely in recent years (in work by Uebel Richardson and 
Friedman) surprisingly little attention has been paid to Mach in that history 
despite his enormous influence on the movement. The Vienna Circle even 
called itself the Ernst Mach Verein at the beginning, when it issued its 
manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis in 1929.  
Mach’s most direct influence on the Circle may have been via the physi-
cist and philosopher Philipp Frank, who taught Mach the special theory of 
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relativity, and who had personal connections to Einstein whom he suc-
ceeded as professor in Prague, where Mach had been active. We also owe 
to Frank (1947, pp. 104-105) an account of the meeting between Mach and 
Einstein in 1910, when Mach admitted that the assumption of atoms could 
be indeed justified as “economical” even if the derivations were indirect 
and complicated (but continuous with observation). Frank himself de-
scribed the origins of “logical empiricism” as an amalgam of Machian ele-
ments and Poincare’s conventionalism (Stadler 1997, pp. 171-172, 190, 
quoting Frank 1949, pp. 7, 11) later replaced with considerations about 
formal structures, enhanced by the emergence of mathematical logic. That 
is, empirical science was to be considered as an interpreted formal system 
where the axioms and definitions are arbitrary and have nothing to do with 
reality at first. The terms get their meaning as they are “implicitly defined” 
by their further development in the formal structure, as Hilbert had in-
sisted. Then one can consider the question of how to coordinate the ab-
stract formal system to observations. Here for example Reichenbach sug-
gested the idea of “coordinative definitions” to link formal notions in a the-
ory (x, t) to physical objects (rods, clocks, light signals, mirrors). 
What is clear already in the work of Schlick in his Allgemeine Erkenntnis-
lehre (1925/1985) and Carnap in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1929/1967), 
was how much this formal, structural side of the project already dominated 
the thinking of the Vienna Circle and how little attention was actually paid 
to Mach’s concrete elements of reality, or to the naïve verification of the so-
called “received view”. The focus was on developing a formalism for scien-
tific theories, clearly not all of which was exposed to observation. This 
“structuralist” reading is confirmed by recent scholarship, for example by 
Richardson (2008) and Friedman (1999) who downplay the verificationism 
of Carnap and emphasize instead his focus on logical structure in the Auf-
bau and the Logical Syntax of Language. The only time the Vienna Circle 
ever considered anything like the Machian elements was during their fa-
mous Protokollsatz debate (see Uebel 2007) and then in shockingly dualistic 
terms, making sharp distinctions between a “physicalistic” and “phenome-
nalistic” reports which were alien to Mach’s neutral monist elements. 
Schlick did once hold that Machian “physical qualities” existed, but that all 
of our knowledge of them was structural (Schlick 1925/1985, p. 284). He 
then apparently converted to a “phenomenalistic” way of thinking in the 
Protokollsatz debate. Carnap also thought a physicalistic basis for the Auf-
bau was possible, perhaps in terms of Machian elements or physical quali-
ties (Carnap 1928/1967, Sec. 62). but he then hewed to the distinction be-
tween a physicalistic and phenomenalistic vocabulary, favoring the physical-
istic over the phenomenal. These distinctions simply do not exist for Mach 
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and are themselves indicative of a metaphysical pseudoproblem, which the 
Vienna Circle did not overcome. 
The greatest difference between Mach and the Circle, in my view, is 
this: Mach was still a “first order” scientist and natural philosopher propos-
ing a theory of real concrete elements and functions, which are not just 
formal devices, to serve as the template for future theories of nature, not 
second-order reconstructions of “the structure of scientific theories” or 
“the language of science” or the other circumlocutions that the Vienna Cir-
cle used. Mach was still dealing with reality, not how to talk about reality, a 
topic which Wittgenstein and Carnap (1950) clearly drove to absurd ex-
tremes. Moreover, as Feyerabend (1970) points out, Mach was critical of es-
tablished science. His analysis was meant to expose logical gaps and loosen 
historically conditioned a priori assumptions, to “reform” science, espe-
cially with his campaign against mechanical physics and its foundational 
concepts of matter, motion, space, and time, which Mach actively sought to 
reduce to his elements. The Vienna Circle was, as Feyerabend puts it, “con-
formist” seeking to reconstruct what science says, but not to challenge it or 
try to improve on it from a philosophical perspective.  
Mach clearly recognized that there is a critical role for philosophy vis a 
vis science, when scientific questions are approached at a higher level of 
generality, as for example happens when we try to unify immediate experi-
ence or sensation with the world view of physics. Many of these issues do 
indeed turn out to be pseudoproblems, as Mach correctly identified them, 
but these do not exhaust the treasure-trove of real “metascientific” phi-
losophical questions in the foundations of empirical sciences like physics 
and also in the macro cross-boundary issues where different empirical sci-
ences meet and must be reconciled. I emphasize: these are real, substantive 
questions about the world for Mach, not mere knots and curlicues in the 
structure of language as Wittgenstein (early and late) would have it. This 
metascientific domain traditionally belonged to metaphysics, but even a 
supposed “anti-metaphysician” like Mach was still able to see it clearly in 
the early twentieth century. As far as I know, and with some exceptions like 
Reichenbach perhaps, the Vienna Circle was utterly blind to this entire me-
tascientific domain of inquiry, perhaps because of the pessimism of Witt-
genstein, or because of their refusal to acknowledge that there could be a 
first order philosophico-scientific inquiry in addition to their second order 
studies of science. 
I think these considerations taken together show that the Vienna Circle 
philosophers were not the heirs of Mach, despite taking his name for their 
original group, but represent a completely different trend which owes more 
to the rise of modern logic and their own peculiar linguistic interpretation 
of scientific theories. Mach, the anti-metaphysician, was in fact a very great 
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defender of metaphysics in the best Aristotelian sense. The Vienna Circle’s 
“scientific philosophy” was not actually part of the ongoing inquiry of natu-
ral science at all but was linguistic and formal, in the sense of backing away 
from reality to a second-order analysis of language and structure. They ig-
nored a central goal of philosophy, as defined by Mach, which is to come to 
grips with reality in its “general features” which are continuous with natural 
science. Many philosophers took the lesson of the failure of logical positiv-
ism to be that we should reject second-order philosophy of language and 
get philosophy back into connection with actual science. But this brings us 
back full circle to Mach again. 
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